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CIA report into shoring up Afghan war support in 

Western Europe 

WikiLeaks release: March 26, 2010 

keywords: WikiLeaks, U.S. intelligence, U.S. Army, National Ground Intelligence Center, NGIC, classified, SE- 
restraint: Classified CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN (US) 

title: CIA Red Cell Special Memorandum; Afghanistan: Sustaining West European Support for the NATO-led 

Mission-Why Counting on Apathy Might Not Be Enough 
date: March 11, 2010 
group: Central Intelligence Agency; Red Cell 
author: CIA Red Cell 

pages: 4 


By WikiLeaks staff ( 

This classified CIA analysis from March, outlines possible PR-strategies to shore up public support in Germany 
and France for a continued war in Afghanistan. After the Dutch government fell on the issue of dutch troops in 
Afghanistan last month, the CIA became worried that similar events could happen in the countries that post the 
third and fourth largest troop contingents to the ISAF-mission. The proposed PR strategies focus on pressure points 
that have been identified within these countries. For France it is the sympathy of the public for Afghan refugees 
and women. For Germany it is the fear of the consequences of defeat (drugs, more refugees, terrorism) as well as 
for Germany's standing in the NATO. The memo is an recipe for the targeted manipulation of public opinion in two 
NATO ally countries, written by the CIA. It is classified as Confidential / No Foreign Nationals. 


CIA Red Cell 

A Red Cell Special Memorandum 

11 March 2010 

This memo was prepared by 
the CIA Red Cell, which has 
been charged by the Director 
of Intelligence with taking a 
pronounced "out-of-the-box" 
approach that will provoke 
thought and offer an 
alternative viewpoint on the 
)"full range of analytic issues. 
^Comments and queries are 
_g welcome and may be directed 
•§to the CIA Red Cell at (703) 

^482-6918/ 482-0169 or 


44462/50127, secure. (C) 






CL BY: 0711195 
CL REASON: 1.4(d) 
DECL ON: 20350303 

Afghanistan: Sustaining West European Support for the NATO-led 
Mission — Why Counting on Apathy Might Not Be Enough (C//NF) 

The fall of the Dutch Government over its troop commitment to Afghanistan 
demonstrates the fragility of European support for the NA TO-led ISAF mission. 
Some NA TO states, notably France and Germany, have counted on public 
apathy about Afghanistan to increase their contributions to the mission, but 
indifference might turn into active hostility if spring and summer fighting 
results in an upsurge in military or Afghan civilian casualties and if a Dutch- 
style debate spills over into other states contributing troops. The Red Cell 
invited a CIA expert on strategic communication and analysts following public 
opinion at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to 
consider information approaches that might better link the Afghan mission to 
the priorities of French, German, and other Western European publics. (C//NF) 

Public Apathy Enables Leaders To I gnore Voters. . . (C//NF) 

The Afghanistan mission's low public salience has allowed French and German leaders to 
disregard popular opposition and steadily increase their troop contributions to the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Berlin and Paris currently maintain the third 
and fourth highest ISAF troop levels, despite the opposition of 80 percent of German and 
French respondents to increased ISAF deployments, according to INR polling in fall 2009. 

• Only a fraction (0.1-1.3 percent) of French and German respondents identified 
"Afghanistan" as the most urgent issue facing their nation in an open-ended 
question, according to the same polling. These publics ranked "stabilizing 
Afghanistan" as among the lowest priorities for US and European leaders, 
according to polls by the German Marshall Fund (GMF) over the past two years. 

• According to INR polling in the fall of 2009, the view that the Afghanistan mission 
is a waste of resources and "not our problem" was cited as the most common 
reason for opposing ISAF by German respondents and was the second most 
common reason by French respondents. But the "not our problem" sentiment also 
suggests that, so for, sending troops to Afghanistan is not yet on most voters' 
radar. (C//NF) 

... But Casualties Could Precipitate Backlash (C//NF) 

If some forecasts of a bloody summer in Afghanistan come to pass, passive French and 
German dislike of their troop presence could turn into active and politically potent hostility. 
The tone of previous debate suggests that a spike in French or German casualties or in 
Afghan civilian casualties could become a tipping point in converting passive opposition 
into active calls for immediate withdrawal. (C//NF) 

French and German commitments to NATO are a safeguard against a precipitous 
departure, but leaders fearing a backlash ahead of spring regional elections might become 
unwilling to pay a political price for increasing troop levels or extending deployments. If 



domestic politics forces the Dutch to depart, politicians elsewhere might cite a precedent for 
"listening to the voters." French and German leaders have over the past two years taken 
steps to preempt an upsurge of opposition but their vulnerability may be higher now: 

• To strengthen support, President Sarkozy called on the National Assembly— whose 
approval is not required for ISAF— to affirm the French mission after the combat 
deaths of 10 soldiers in August 2008. The government won the vote handily, 
defusing a potential crisis and giving Sarkozy cover to deploy approximately 3,000 
additional troops. Sarkozy, however, may now be more vulnerable to an upsurge in 
casualties because his party faces key regional elections this March and the already 
low support for ISAF has fallen by one-third since March 2009, according to INR 
polling in the fall of 2009. 

• Political fallout from the German-ordered Kunduz airstrike in September 2009 which 
killed dozens of Afghan civilians, demonstrated the potential pressure on the 
German Government when Afghanistan issues come up on the public radar. 
Concern about the potential effects of Afghanistan issues on the state-level election 
in North Rhine-Westphalia in May 2010 could make Chancellor Merkel— who has 

^ shown an unwillingness to expend political capital on Afghanistan— more hesitant 

^ about increasing or even sustaining Germany's ISAF contributions. (C//NF) 

■§ Tailoring Messaging Could Forestall or At Least Contain Backlash (C//NF) 


^ Western European publics might be better prepared to tolerate a spring and summer of 

i greater military and civilian casualties if they perceive clear connections between outcomes 

> in Afghanistan and their own priorities. A consistent and iterative strategic communication 

^ program across NATO troop contributors that taps into the key concerns of specific Western 

g European audiences could provide a buffer if today's apathy becomes tomorrow's opposition 

jj to ISAF, giving politicians greater scope to support deployments to Afghanistan. (C//NF) 

French Focused On Civilians and Refugees. Focusing on a message that ISAF benefits 
Afghan civilians and citing examples of concrete gains could limit and perhaps even reverse 
opposition to the mission. Such tailored messages could tap into acute French concern for 
civilians and refugees. Those who support ISAF in INR surveys from fall 2009 most 
frequently cited their perception that the mission helps Afghan civilians, while opponents 
most commonly argued that the mission hurts civilians. Contradicting the "ISAF does more 
harm than good" perception is clearly important, particularly for France's Muslim minority: 

• Highlighting Afghans' broad support for ISAF could underscore the mission's 
positive impact on civilians. About two-thirds of Afghans support the presence of 
ISAF forces in Afghanistan, according to a reliable ABC/BBC/ADR poll conducted in 
December 2009. According to INR polling in fall 2009, those French and German 
respondents who believed that the Afghan people oppose ISAF— 48 percent and 52 
percent, respectively— were more likely than others to oppose participation in the 

• Conversely, messaging that dramatizes the potential adverse consequences of an 
ISAF defeat for Afghan civilians could leverage French (and other European) guilt 
for abandoning them. The prospect of the Taliban rolling back hard-won progress 
on girls' education could provoke French indignation, become a rallying point for 
France's largely secular public, and give voters a reason to support a good and 
necessary cause despite casualties. 




• The media controversy generated by Paris's decision to expel 12 Afghan refugees in 
late 2009 suggests that stories about the plight of Afghan refugees are likely to 
resonate with French audiences. The French government has already made 
combating Afghan human trafficking networks a priority and would probably 
support an information campaign that a NATO defeat in Afghanistan could 
precipitate a refugee crisis. (C//NF) 

Germans Worried About Price And Principle Of ISAF Mission. German opponents of 
ISAF worry that a war in Afghanistan is a waste of resources, not a German problem, and 
objectionable in principle, judging from an INR poll in the fall of 2009. Some German 
opposition to ISAF might be muted by proof of progress on the ground, warnings about the 
potential consequences for Germany of a defeat, and reassurances that Germany is a 
valued partner in a necessary NATO-led mission. 

• Underscoring the contradiction between German pessimism about ISAF and Afghan 
optimism about the mission's progress could challenge skeptics' assertions that the 
mission is a waste of resources. The same ABC/BBC/ADR poll revealed that 70 
percent of Afghans thought their country was heading in the right direction and 
would improve in 2010, while a 2009 GMF poll showed that about the same 

a proportion of German respondents were pessimistic about ever stabilizing 

J Afghanistan. 



£ • Messages that dramatize the consequences of a NATO defeat for specific German 

^ interests could counter the widely held perception that Afghanistan is not 

i Germany's problem. For example, messages that illustrate how a defeat in 

> Afghanistan could heighten Germany's exposure to terrorism, opium, and refugees 

^ might help to make the war more salient to skeptics. 


jj • Emphasis on the mission's multilateral and humanitarian aspects could help ease 

J Germans' concerns about waging any kind of war while appealing to their desire to 

3 support multilateral efforts. Despite their allergy to armed conflict, Germans were 

\ willing to break precedent and use force in the Balkans in the 1990s to show 

a commitment to their NATO allies. German respondents cited helping their allies as 

£ one of the most compelling reasons for supporting I SAF, according to an I NR poll in 

the fall of 2009. (C//NF) 

Appeals by President Obama and Afghan Women Might Gain Traction (C//NF) 

The confidence of the French and German publics in President Obama's ability to handle 
foreign affairs in general and Afghanistan in particular suggest that they would be receptive 
to his direct affirmation of their importance to the ISAF mission— and sensitive to direct 
expressions of disappointment in allies who do not help. 1 

• According to a GMF poll conducted in J une 2009, about 90 percent of French and 
German respondents were confident in the President's ability to handle foreign 
policies. The same poll revealed that 82 percent of French and 74 percent of 
German respondents were confident in the President's ability to stabilize 
Afghanistan, although the subsequent wait for the US surge strategy may have 
eroded some of this confidence. 

1 European hand wringing about the President's lack of attendance at a EU summit and commentary 
that his absence showed that Europe counted for less suggests that worry about European standing 
with Washington might provide at least some leverage for sustaining contributions to ISAF. (C//NF) 








• The same poll also found that, when respondents were reminded that President 
Obama himself had asked for increased deployments to Afghanistan, their support 
for granting this request increased dramatically, from 4 to 15 percent among 
French respondents and from 7 to 13 percent among Germans. The total 
percentages may be small but they suggest significant sensitivity to disappointing a 
president seen as broadly in sync with European concerns. (C//NF) 

Afghan women could serve as ideal messengers in humanizing the ISAF role in combating 
the Taliban because of women's ability to speak personally and credibly about their 
experiences under the Taliban, their aspirations for the future, and their fears of a Taliban 
victory. Outreach initiatives that create media opportunities for Afghan women to share 
their stories with French, German, and other European women could help to overcome 
pervasive skepticism among women in Western Europe toward the ISAF mission. 

• According to INR polling in the fall of 2009, French women are 8 percentage points 
less likely to support the mission than are men, and German women are 22 
percentage points less likely to support the war than are men. 

• Media events that feature testimonials by Afghan women would probably be most 

^ effective if broadcast on programs that have large and disproportionately female 

$ audiences. (C//NF) 


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